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Up, Down and Reciprocal: The Dynamics of 
Intergenerational Transfers, Family Structure and 
Health in a Low-Income Context 
 
 
Abstract: 
 
In the absence of well-functioning public transfer systems and safety nets, the family acts as the 
key provider of income and support through the intergenerational redistribution of resources. In 
this paper we use micro-level longitudinal data and a mix of methodologies to document the life-
cycle patterns of financial transfers in a rural, sub-Saharan African population. Underneath a well-
established age-pattern of intergenerational transfers in which transfer patterns change according 
to broad stages of the economic life cycle, our analyses document significant heterogeneity and 
fluidity: Intergenerational transfers are variable and reverse their direction, with individuals moving 
between the provider and recipient states repeatedly across their life course and within each 
major stage of the life-cycle. Contrary to common perceptions about family transfers ameliorating 
short-term shocks, transfers in our analyses are driven primarily by demographic factors such as 
changes in health, household size, and household composition, rather than short-term events. 
Overall our analyses suggest that the role of transfers in this rural sub-Saharan context is 
significantly more complex than suggested by theories and evidence on aggregate transfer 
patterns, and at the micro-level, intergenerational transfers encapsulate multiple functions ranging 
from direct exchange to old-age support in the absence of a public pension system. 
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Up, Down and Reciprocal: The Dynamics of Intergenerational 
Transfers, Family Structure and Health in a Low-Income Context 
 
Introduction 
 
During the last two decades, the increase in surveys aimed at quantifying monetary and non-
monetary exchanges has led to remarkable advances in measuring, modelling, and assessing 
the implications of intergenerational transfers at both the micro and the macro level. This 
expansion in data availability, together with the conceptual development of the National Transfer 
Accounts (NTA) framework (Lee and Mason, 2011), has led to a flourishing body of research 
aimed at understanding the functioning of the generational economy and the role of private and 
public transfers in shaping life-cycle economic trends. Extensive research from high-income 
contexts has shown private transfers typically flow from members of the older generations to 
their children and grandchildren, while public transfers tend to flow in the opposite direction 
(Kluge and Vogt, 2015; Lee and Donehower, 2011).  
Though these macro-level life-cycle patterns are well-understood in higher-income 
contexts, there are reasons to believe the dynamics of intergenerational transfers may be 
substantially different in low-income countries. In the absence of well-functioning public transfer 
systems in most low-income populations, families act as key providers of income support, 
largely through the redistribution of resources from productive middle-aged adults to dependent 
relatives at both younger and older ages (Ben-Porath, 1980; Frankenberg et al., 2002). Yet, in 
contrast to public transfers, the smooth reallocation of resources within the family is dependent 
on several dynamic household characteristics, including the health status of its members, the 
size and composition of the household, and exposure to frequent economic and demographic 
shocks common to low-income contexts. However, our understanding of how external shocks, 
changes in health and well-being, and shifting household composition impact intergenerational 
transfers at the micro level is limited, due largely to the dearth of available data from longitudinal 
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surveys measuring intergenerational transfers in low-income populations. In this paper, we seek 
to fill this gap by utilizing longitudinal data from rural Malawi to gain a greater understanding of 
how intergenerational resource flows play out over the life course in a low-income sub-Saharan 
African (SSA) population, and how health conditions, external shocks, and changes in 
household composition effect these transfer patterns.    
 
Background 
 
Much of the recent literature on life-cycle intergenerational transfer flows has developed within 
the NTA project, which currently covers 51 countries across the world, including seven in SSA 
(Benin, Ghana, Kenya, Mozambique, Nigeria, Senegal, and South Africa). The NTA framework 
formalizes the idea that as individuals pass through their life-cycle (from young to youth, youth 
to working, and working to old age), both production and consumption changes create deficits – 
consumption exceeding production – and surpluses – production exceeding consumption – in 
resources. Although the NTA project provides a useful framework to describe the macro-level 
trends in life-cycle economic production and consumption, this model has limited applicability to 
understanding the complex determinants of household economics and intergenerational 
transfers at the micro level.  The NTA age profiles rely on aggregate and cross-sectional 
analyses of individuals of various ages at a certain point in time. These cross-sectional age-
patterns may not represent the behavior of actual individuals over their life-course, as 
individuals’ actions are influenced by both period and cohort effects. Hence, while the NTA age 
patterns can be used to construct pseudo-cohort datasets, they do not trace the same 
individuals throughout their lives, and are therefore limited in their utility to understand the 
drivers and consequences of micro-level changes in transfer patterns (see D’Albis and Moosa, 
2015, for a comprehensive overview of the NTA project, together with the challenges and 
limitations it presents).   
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In contexts such as sub-Saharan Africa, where social protection schemes are largely 
absent, understanding the drivers of intergenerational transfers at the micro level is of key 
importance. SSA is undergoing rapid economic and demographic changes, making it a 
particularly interesting and policy-relevant area to investigate intergenerational transfers. While 
rapid population growth continues to be a major social and policy issue (Cleland et al., 2006; 
Kohler, 2013), demographic and epidemiological trends of falling fertility and increasing life 
expectancy foreshadow the coming challenge of a growing elderly population in SSA. In 
addition, Malawi and much of Southern and Eastern SSA face the challenge of combining the 
potential benefits arising from the demographic dividend with high shares of middle-aged adults 
affected by functional disability and/or HIV (Narayana, 2015; Payne et al., 2013). Countries 
across sub-Saharan Africa are projected to experience very substantial gains in their support 
ratios, with increases of 36% in Nigeria and 25% in Kenya between 2010 and 2050 (Lee and 
Mason, 2011). These changes are likely to profoundly shape the dynamics of transfer patterns 
in the region.  
 Our analyses focus on prime-aged adults—those aged 20-59—to understand how 
individuals in their key years of economic productivity expand, contract, and shift their patterns 
of financial transfers in response to changing micro-level conditions. Adopting the perspective of 
prime-aged adults is meaningful for a number of reasons. First, previous studies have shown 
that these individuals tend to be net providers of financial resources to dependent relatives at 
younger and older ages, i.e. they are the so-called “sandwich generation” (Grundy and 
Henretta, 2006; Kohler et al., 2012). Second, declining fertility in much of SSA is likely to result 
in a growing proportion of middle-aged adults in coming decades, leading to the potential of a 
demographic dividend and higher prospects for economic growth and development (Canning et 
al., 2015). Third, AIDS-related morbidity and mortality peak at primary adult ages, thereby 
affecting the ability of prime-aged adults to care for their elderly members, and increasing the 
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pressures on alternative support networks (Merli and Palloni, 2006; Payne and Kohler, 2017; 
Zagheni, 2011). 
In this paper we provide three contributions to the literature on intergenerational 
transfers. First, we investigate patterns of financial transfers by drawing on rich longitudinal data 
from rural Malawi that include information on intergenerational transfers across three 
generations living in a context characterized by high poverty and high morbidity. Very few 
studies of intergenerational transfers exist from similar low-income contexts, despite the 
centrality of intergenerational transfers as a key function of families, and no other studies exist 
from such contexts that include the detailed longitudinal information that is utilized in our 
analyses.  Second, our analyses adopt a multi-state life table approach to estimate duration of 
life in various transfer states – namely provider, neutral, and recipient – with both children and 
elderly parents. This approach allows us to describe life-course trajectories of intergenerational 
relations in ways that have not previously been documented. As family members in rural Malawi 
tend to rely on each other in times of financial hardship (Kohler et al., 2012), we are thus able to 
show how transfer patterns evolve across the life-course, with individuals cycling through 
periods of time being net recipients and net providers of transfers, and how transfer patterns 
adapt to predictable changes in family contexts and unexpected socioeconomic shocks. Third, 
our analyses contribute to the literature by documenting the links between household 
composition, middle-aged adults’ physical and mental health, external stressors such as 
household-level shocks, and intergenerational transfer patterns using fixed-effects regression 
models. These analyses rely on within-family variation to investigate the substantial 
heterogeneity underlying intergenerational transfer patterns in SSA, hence providing important 
insights into the micro-level dynamics of intergenerational economics in a low-resource setting. 
  
Motivations and Drivers of Intergenerational Transfers in Rural Malawi: Health, Shocks, 
and Household Structure 
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In low-resource contexts, the motivations for intergenerational transfers are largely captured by 
four broad hypotheses (Frankenberg et al., 2002; Lillard and Willis, 1997). First, family members 
may have altruistic feelings (altruism hypothesis) toward one another, and the head of the 
household may choose to transfer resources to needier family members – with no expectation 
of repayment – in an effort to maximize the weighted sum of the utility functions of all members 
(Becker and Tomes, 1976). Second, transfers among kin may provide a source of insurance 
against risk (risk and insurance hypothesis), whereby family members transfer resources to help 
one another in times of need, hence smoothing consumption in times of uncertainty. Common to 
both hypotheses, the altruism and insurance models predict that transfers to and from an 
individual should fluctuate with short-term income and/or income-related shocks (Frankenberg 
et al., 2002). Alternatively, the exchange hypothesis states that intra-family transfers are based 
on exchange and reciprocity (in terms of both money and time) – rather than on consumption-
smoothing motives (Cox, 1987). Lastly, couples might see children as the primary long-term 
mechanism of saving for old age, and rear them with the expectation that they will provide for 
them later in life in the form of upward transfers (old-age security hypothesis) (Caldwell, 1976; 
Leibenstein, 1957; Neher, 1971; Willis, 1979).  
 
Health and transfers 
 
Our study population in Malawi faces a heavy disease burden, characterized by high levels of 
child and adult mortality, high prevalence of tuberculosis, malaria, and HIV/AIDS, and a growing 
burden of non-communicable diseases (Crampin et al., 2016; Msyamboza et al., 2014, 2011). 
Recent WHO statistics show that 10.6% of the Malawians aged 15-49 are currently living with 
HIV/AIDS, with around 55,000 new HIV infections occurring every year (WHO, 2014). In Malawi 
and elsewhere in sub-Saharan Africa, working-age adults bear the highest health and economic 
consequences from the epidemic (Kohler et al., 2015). While the rollout of no-cost antiretroviral 
therapy has begun to successfully reduce mortality in prime adult ages in Malawi (Floyd et al., 
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2010; Payne and Kohler, 2017), the broader health conditions are still poor. Within the MLSFH 
sample, Payne et al. (2013) identify high rates of functional limitations and clear gradients in 
economic activity by physical health status among mature adults; and Kohler et al. 
(Forthcoming) provide evidence that the prevalence of poor mental health (particularly 
depression and anxiety) rises rapidly with age in this population.  
Given the lack of institutionalized support systems, functional limitations and poor mental 
health in late midlife and older adulthood may have tremendous impacts on individual and 
household economic well-being in a subsistence-agriculture economy. There are multiple 
channels by which poor health may affect transfer patterns. Most directly, individuals 
experiencing poor physical or mental health may be unable to complete their daily tasks, 
resulting in a loss of labor output and economic productivity, and thereby constraining the 
resource pool available for providing transfers. In Malawi, as in most other Sub-Saharan low-
income countries, labor force participation is virtually universal—data from the 2013 Malawi 
Labor Force Survey show that overall labor force participation rate is 89%, with rates remaining 
high into older ages (94% for ages 50–54 and 87% for age 60+). In addition to these direct 
effects on household resources, individuals experiencing poor health are likely to be a drain on 
the scarce time and material resources of younger generations, and may contribute less and 
require more time and money from both younger and older individuals in the household (Kohler 
et al., 2012).  
 
Shocks and transfers 
 
Households in rural Malawi are frequently exposed to sources of vulnerability that pose serious 
challenges to their organizational and financial needs (Kohler et al., 2015). Economic 
vulnerability – defined as the risk of future monetary poverty – is especially high due to the 
heavy concentration of Malawians clustered around the poverty line, and the frequency and 
severity of shocks such as droughts, floods and food price fluctuations, as well as idiosyncratic 
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shocks such as accidents, illnesses and deaths of family members. These shocks differ from 
persistent poverty to the extent that they are unpredictable and transitory in both their nature 
and effects (Stroud and Anglewicz, 2015). Using data from the 2004/05 Integrated Household 
Survey, Devereux et al. (2006) claim that many Malawians are even more vulnerable today than 
in the past: rainfall and food production are more erratic, HIV/AIDS is still pervasive, markets are 
weak and prices are volatile; and their ability to cope has declined: livelihoods are dangerously 
undiversified, repeated shocks have eroded assets and savings, and established networks are 
less willing or able to provide assistance. These external events may also interact with health 
conditions in ways that exacerbate their effects on financial well-being and intergenerational 
transfer dynamics. 
How unexpected shocks influence patterns of intergenerational transfers, however, is far 
from clear. In low-income contexts with poor public social support structures, intergenerational 
transfers may operate similarly to an insurance system, with transfers acting to smooth 
consumption and support individuals most affected by income losses (Davies, 2010; Lillard and 
Willis, 1997; Platteau, 1997; Stroud and Anglewicz, 2015). In such a case, we would expect a 
shift in transfer flows in reaction to an external shock. However, in the case of rural Malawi, the 
effect of external shocks may be more complex—the limited availability of savings and low rates 
of employment outside of subsistence and/or cash crop farming could make the connection 
between household-level shocks and transfers less direct, as this lack of diversification in 
income sources could leave family members with limited recourse to change transfer patterns in 
response to major events. Our analysis incorporates these external forces into our 
understanding of micro-level variation in life-course patterns of transfers, distinguishing between 
individual health conditions and household composition versus volatile determinants – such as 
shocks – as drivers of intergenerational transfers.   
 
Household structure and transfers 
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The demographic composition of households is a significant, though often overlooked 
determinant of intergenerational transfer flows. Most obviously, downward and upward transfers 
are constrained and determined by the availability of transfer partners within the household. For 
instance, using MLSFH data Kohler et al. (2012) find that conditional on parents being alive, 
financial transfers from prime-aged individuals to their parents are widespread and do not follow 
a strong age pattern, despite the marked decline of parental health among older prime-aged 
respondents. Second – and related to the above – transfers vary as a function of household 
size. A higher number of living children is generally associated with higher levels of financial 
transfers given and received. Evidence from Malawi suggests that this relationship is complex, 
and transfers may be concentrated on a relatively small subset of children (Kohler et al., 2012). 
Lastly, the sex-composition of the household interacts with transfer patterns; we expect gender 
to play a role for both transfer providers – where women tend to provide lower transfers than 
men (Lesthaeghe, 1989) – and transfer recipients, with elderly women receiving higher net 
financial transfers. Differential investments in children by parents are complex, reflecting 
structural conditions, gendered roles, and parental preferences. Prior research provides 
suggestive evidence of a “son preference” argument in this context, whereby both male and 
female respondents provide more financial transfers to their sons than to their daughters (Kohler 
et al., 2012; Lesthaeghe, 1989).  
 
Data and Methodology 
 
Data for these analyses come from the Malawi Longitudinal Survey of Families and Health 
(MLSFH). A “Cohort Profile” of the MLSFH, providing a detailed discussion of the MLSFH study 
context, sampling procedures, survey methods, survey instruments, and analyses of attrition 
has been published in the International Journal of Epidemiology (Kohler et al., 2015). The study 
is based in three districts in rural Malawi: Rumphi in the north, Mchinji in the center, and Balaka 
in the south. While these rural regions are similar in terms of their overall epidemiological, 
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socioeconomic, and subsistence-agriculture characterization they also reflect some 
heterogeneity in terms of marriage patterns, religious affiliations, schooling, patrilineal versus 
matrilineal inheritance and land ownership practices, and HIV prevalence. MLSFH respondents 
(N ≈3,800) are evenly split among the three study locations and clustered in 121 villages. Our 
analyses use data from MLSFH rounds collected in 2006, 2008, 2010, and 2012. In 2008, the 
MLSFH added a sample of about 550 parents of original MLSFH respondents, substantially 
increasing the population of mature adults (aged 45+ y) in the study.  
 Transfers are parameterized based on a household roster collected in each wave, in 
which individuals were asked to report all financial assistance they had given to and/or received 
from members of their household age 15 or over in the past two years. The MLSFH household 
and family roster includes all individuals who currently live in the household, and also asked 
information about all parents and children independent of their survival and resident status, 
including their demographic, socioeconomic, and health characteristics and transfers received 
and given from the respondent’s perspective. Since the quantitative measurement of transfers in 
contexts such as Malawi is inherently difficult, the MLSFH did not attempt to monetize the 
financial transfers between respondents and their children or parents. Instead, for all alive 
parents and children above age 15, MLSFH respondents were asked a set of questions about 
financial assistance during the last two years, including the two questions from which we derive 
our measures of intergenerational transfers: “Have you given (NAME) any money or financial 
assistance?” and “Has (NAME) given you any money or financial assistance?”, with response 
categories of “No”, “Yes, a little”, “Yes, some”, and “Yes, a lot”. To generate a metric of net 
transfers received and provided, we weight these transfers by respondent’s categorization – 
“Yes, a little” counts as 1 unit of transfers, “Yes, some” counts as 2 units, and “Yes, a lot” counts 
as 3 units of transfers. These transfers are then aggregated across household members to 
generate a continuous measure of total net transfers. Children under the age of 15, for whom no 
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direct measures of transfers are asked in the MLSFH, are assumed to receive 3 units (“a lot”) of 
transfers.  
We recognize that more detailed information on the amount of transfers would be 
desirable, but such information on the monetary value of transfers exists neither in the MLSFH 
nor in other longitudinal data in sub-Saharan Africa.  For our purpose, however, the limitation 
might be less severe than it initially seems. Specifically, by relying on the subjective assessment 
of respondents about the value of transfers (“a little”, “some” and “a lot” of financial assistance), 
we reduce concerns about measurement error in respondents’ reports about the monetary value 
of transfers. Even if monetary measures were available, their interpretation would be difficult as 
income in volatile and inherently difficult to measure in subsistence agriculture contexts such as 
rural Malawi, and even small monetary transfers might be “very important” to respondents if they 
come during a period of crises. By relying on respondents’ assessments about the value of 
transfers, our approach normalizes intergenerational transfers with respect to how important 
these exchanges are in respondents’ lived experience, and how the respondent compares the 
transfers given and received to other resources that are available to the household. This is 
arguably a more important metric than the actual monetary amount transferred. 
As a first step to better understand the dynamic nature of transfers across the life course 
of individuals, we analyze the transition probabilities between different transfer states in this 
population over age, and use these transition probabilities to construct a multi-state life table 
model to estimate the duration of life spent in different transfer states across the life-course. For 
the multi-state analyses, individuals are grouped into three transfer states depending on the 
number of net transfers they have provided to/received from their children and parents: 
individuals providing +2 or more net transfers to their children or parents are classified as 
providers, individuals with +1 to -1 net transfers are classified as neutral, and individuals with -2 
or less net transfers are classified as recipients.1 
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We estimate the conditional probabilities of experiencing a transition between these 
three transfer states (provider, neutral, recipient), a state for individuals with no living 
parents/children, and death as function of age and gender, using a logistic discrete-time hazard 
model of the form: 
𝑙𝑜𝑔
𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡)
𝑝𝑖𝑖(𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡)
= 𝛽0𝑖𝑗 + 𝛽1𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡 + 𝛽2𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑎𝑔𝑒𝑡2 + 𝛽3𝑖𝑗 ∗ 𝑚𝑎𝑙𝑒 
where 𝑝𝑖𝑗(𝑎𝑔𝑒, 𝑡) is the transition probability from current health state i (with i = provider, neutral, 
recipient, no parents/children, deceased) to health state j (with i provider, neutral, recipient, no 
parents/children, deceased2) over the interval from time t - 1 to t, 𝛽0𝑖𝑗 is the intercept, 𝛽1𝑖𝑗 and 
𝛽2𝑖𝑗 are the coefﬁcients for age and age squared, and 𝛽3𝑖𝑗 is the coefﬁcient for male. Transition 
probability estimates were obtained using PROC SURVEYLOGISTIC in SAS v9.4, accounting 
for variation at the region, village, and individual level. We then obtain life expectancies in these 
states using a multi-state life table (MSLT) model estimated from the MLSFH data. Our 
estimation method is based on an adapted version of the Stochastic Population Analysis for 
Complex Events program (Cai et al., 2010). Specifically, to calculate MSLT functions we use 
micro-simulation to create synthetic cohorts of 100,000 individuals with the same initial gender 
and transfer state distributions as the study population. We ‘‘age’’ these individuals forward year 
by year using age- and gender-specific mortality rates and probabilities of transitioning in and 
out of transfer states estimated from the data. This process is then repeated at each age until 
death. The resulting synthetic cohort is analyzed to estimate life expectancy in each transfer 
state. 
In addition to generating estimates of proportion of individuals in each transfer grouping 
by age and partial life expectancies in transfer states, we use fixed-effects regression to explore 
how changes in household composition and health – both health of respondent and health of 
transfer partner – and household-level shocks relate to the amount of transfers given and 
received by middle-aged respondents to/from children and to/from parents. To establish the 
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linear relationship between transfers and health, we utilize the Mental (MCS) and Physical 
(PCS) Health Composite Scores from the SF-12 health questionnaire (Ware et al., 1996). The 
MCS and PCS are widely used measures of subjective self-assessment of overall mental and 
physical health, respectively, that have been validated in several different contexts (Fischer and 
Corcoran, 2013; Jenkinson et al., 2001; Macran et al., 2003). SF-12 results are normed to a 
mean of 50, and higher scores reflect better health. In addition to the MCS and PCS 
composites, we are interested in understanding how passing certain thresholds of physical and 
mental health may affect transfer patterns. We thus complement these continuous measures 
with two categorical variables: one measuring mental health through a combined depression 
and anxiety index (DAX, parameterized as in Kohler et al., Forthcoming),3 and physical health 
through limitations on daily activities (parameterized as in Payne et al., 2013).4 Response 
categories for both variables range from “1” (no) to “3” (severe). Lastly, data on social and 
economic shocks are collected by asking respondents if the household experienced any of the 
following stressors in the preceding two years: (i) death or serious illness of an adult member 
who provides support the household; (ii) poor crop yields or loss of livestock; (iii) loss of a 
significant source of income; (iv) a breakup or divorce within the household; (v) a damage to the 
house due to flood or fire. For each of these shocks we constructed a dummy that equals one if 
the event occurred in the previous two years, together with a new variable tallying the number of 
shocks each respondent reported experiencing over the previous two years. 
[Table 1 about here] 
Table 1 reports descriptive statistics on the variables of interest defined above, by survey 
wave. The sample includes approximately 3,500 respondents in 2006, 2008 and 2010, while it 
decreases to around 1,300 in 2012, as only individuals 45+ were re-surveyed. Respondents 
experienced significant declines in physical and mental health with increasing age, as confirmed 
by the change in mean SF-12 scores and the increasing prevalence of physical limitation and 
DAX as the sample aged between 2006 and 2012. The prevalence of external shocks is fairly 
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stable across waves. The bottom panel of Table 1 suggests that these shocks occur frequently 
for rural populations in Malawi – at least 35 per cent of respondents experienced a death or 
serious illness of a household member, poor crop yields, or the loss of a significant source of 
income.  
 
Results 
 
a. Age profiles and multi-state modeling 
 
Life-cycle transfer patterns 
 
Figure 1 provides an overview of life-cycle intergenerational transfers between respondents and 
their children in the MLSFH sample. These panels show net and total transfers to/from 
respondent’s children by 5-year age groups (estimated via OLS) pooled across the 2006, 2008, 
2010, and 2012 MLSFH waves. Positive numbers on the Y-axis denote a net outflow of 
transfers, while negative numbers denote a net inflow of transfers. Panel A shows a graph of 
total provided, received, and net transfers with children, by age. Here, we see that the magnitide 
of financial transfers with children is quite high—respondents report a high level of transfer 
activity with children, though this is in large part a function of the large family sizes present in 
the sample. Respondents are almost exclusively providers of financial transfers until about age 
40. With increasing age, however, transfers provided decline substantially, and reported 
transfers received increase, to the point where individuals are on average net recipients of 
financial transfers after about age 60. Panel B shows net financial transfers to/from children by 
sex. Women provide fewer financial transfers than men, and reach the peak of their distribution 
of transfers earlier in life than men—at around age 35, versus a peak in the mid-40’s for men. 
Women also become net recipients of transfers at a much younger age than do men—at about 
age 55, versus 67 for men. Panel C shows net transfers to/from children by the reported 
physical health of the respondent. Individuals with moderate or severe limitations on their 
physical activities have lower net transfers than individuals with no limitations, a difference that 
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widens with increasing age. Though on average healthy individuals do not become net transfer 
recipients until about age 65, individuals with limitations on their activities report becoming net 
recipients at much younger ages—approximately 52 for severely limited individuals, and 56 for 
moderately limited individuals. Panel D shows the commensurate analysis for our mental health 
indicator and provides evidence of a similar health gradient. These graphs suggest  that health 
significantly shapes transfer patterns in a low-income country like Malawi, hence contributing to 
a better understanding of the heterogeneity underlying these dynamics. These descriptive 
findings are also confirmed by our random-effects regressions (Table A1) reported in the 
Appendix. 
[Figure 1 about here] 
Figure 2 shows the corresponding age patterns of transfers to/from parents. For 
transfers to parents, we limit our analyses to ages 20-59, as the proportion of individuals with 
living parents dimishes rapidly beyond age 60. Panel A shows the graph for transfers provided, 
received, and net transfers to parents. We see that the overall magnitude of transfers with 
parents is substantially smaller than for transfers with children. Individuals report receiving more 
transfers from their parents in early life, but are net providers of transfers after their early 20’s—
a finding in contrast with much other research from higher-income contexts (Lee and 
Donehower, 2011). In Panel B, we note that there are substantial sex differences in net 
transfers, with men reporting providing more financial assistance to their parents than women. 
Panels C and D show that transfers with parents vary modestly by respondent’s health status 
(both physical and mental), but the differentials across health status are relatively small and 
confidence intervals large due to the smaller sample sizes in these groups in older ages (due 
largely to the small number of older individuals with surviving parents). 
[Figure 2 about here] 
 
Transfer state transitions  
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A major advantage of the MLSFH data is the availability of data on intergenerational transfers 
covering a period of 8 years (beginning two years prior to the 2006 survey until 2012), which 
allows us to study the dynamics of transfers in a longitudinal perspective. Importantly, our 
analyses of the 2006-2012 MLSFH reveal that individuals in this population experience a 
relatively large number of transitions between transfer states over their life course—that is, 
though the overall patterns of transfers shown above suggest fairly regular age profiles, within 
the life-course of an individual these patterns are far less consistent. Table 2 shows the 
distribution of all wave-to-wave transitions between transfer states that are observed in the 
population during the study period. The top panel displays the observed distribution of wave-to-
wave transitions for transfer states to children, aggregated across 2006-2012. Individuals can 
contribute multiple transitions, i.e. an individual interviewed in each of the 2006, 2008, 2010, 
and 2012 waves would contribute three periods of observation (2006-2008, 2008-2010, and 
2010-2012). In the 20-39 age group, individuals are likely to be, and to remain, net providers of 
transfers to their children—in almost 80% of observation periods, the respondent was a net 
provider to their children in both waves. With increasing age, however, heterogeneity in wave-
to-wave transitions increases—in the 40-59 year olds, 10% of transitions are from net provider 
to net neutral or recipient, and individuals are nearly as likely to transition from net neutral to 
either net provider or net recipient of transfers. By ages 60+, almost a third of individuals are net 
recipients of transfers from their children at both interviews, compared with only 15% who report 
being net providers of transfers, and rates of transition to net recipient from net neutral or net 
provider are high (53% from initially net neutral, and 29% from initially net provider). 
[Table 2 about here] 
The bottom panel of Table 2 shows wave-to-wave transitions for transfer states to 
parents, aggregated across 2006-2012. In both the younger and older age ranges, there is a 
substantial amount of movement between transfer states—over half of 20-39 year olds and 40-
59 year olds with living parents move to a different transfer state between successive waves of 
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interviews. With increasing age, individuals are less likely to become recipients, and more likely 
to transition to providing transfers to their parents—for those aged 40-59 with living parents, 
35% of wave-to-wave transitions end in providing net transfers (this figure is 28% for 20-39 year 
olds). Individuals in early adulthood (ages 20-39) are three times as likely to transition into being 
net recipients of transfers compared with those 40-59—about 12% of transitions among the 20-
39-year old population are into net recipient, compared with only 4% for those 40-59.  
 
Partial life expectancies 
 
To gain insights into the life-course dynamics of transfers in this population, we model the 
underlying age- and gender-specific annual transition probabilities between transfer states for 
both transfers to/from parents and transfers to/from children, and use these transition 
probabilities to generate multi-state life table estimates. This approach permits to investigate the 
aggregate patterns of transfers over age in this population, as well as to estimate life 
expectancies (LE) in different transfer states. Table 3 presents partial life expectancies in the 
three transfer states, by age group. These estimates represent the length of time the average 
individual will spend in net provider, neutral, and net recipient states between the ages of, for 
instance, 20 and 29 (as well as his/her life expectancy in this age range). This approach allows 
us to get a detailed picture of the life-course transfer patterns in this society, something that is 
only possible through the type of longitudinal micro-level data available from the MLSFH. Panel 
A presents partial life expectancies in each transfer state with children. For these partial life 
expectancies, we condition on an individual having living children at the initial age—so, the 
partial LE estimates for ages 20-29 are conditional on having a child at age 20—and exclude 
the small number of individuals who experience the death of all biological children. Partial life 
expectancies in the recipient state increase with age, and partial life expectancies in net 
provider status decline as a portion of total life expectancy. These changes are most evident in 
the 50-59 and 60+ age groups, where a rapid shift occurs in transfer patterns to/from children.  
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[Table 3 about here] 
Panel B presents life expectancies in transfer states with parents. Again, these figures 
are contingent on having at least one living parent at the initial age (so, 20, 30, 40, and 50). 
Younger individuals aged 20-29 expect to spend about 15% of these years as net recipients of 
transfers from their parents, but with increasing age individuals spend less time receiving 
financial transfers from their parents. After the age of 30, being a net recipient of financial 
transfers from parents is quite rare. Males expect to spend over a 30% of their years between 
30 and 59 providing net financial transfers to their parents (this figure is about 20% for females), 
and with increasing age, individuals are less likely to have living parents for the full age interval 
(diminishing steadily from an average of 1.5 years with no parents among the 20-29 year olds to 
about 3 years for 50-59 year olds. Figure A1 in the Appendix presents proportion of living 
individuals who are in each transfer state with children and parents at each age in the micro-
simulated stationary-equivalent population. 
 
b. Multivariate fixed-effects regressions  
 
Having established that life-course transfer patterns are variable across age, we next move to a 
closer investigation of the factors that drive these patterns in rural Malawi. Specifically, we 
explore how intergenerational transfers are affected by different sources of life-course 
variability, such as changes in household composition, health conditions, and household-level 
shocks. Our aim in this section is not to identify which of the several mechanisms discussed in 
the relevant literature conforms best to the transfer patterns observed in rural Malawi (e.g. old-
age security, parental repayment, risk and insurance, altruism, exchange, etc.) (Lillard and 
Willis, 1997). Rather, we explore how changes three of the most relevant sources of life-course 
heterogeneity—health, household composition, and external shocks—may explain the dynamic 
patterns of intergenerational transfers in this context.  
19 
 
 We acknowledge that multivariate regressions on transfers, health, and shocks are likely 
affected by endogenous characteristics that influence these measures simultaneously. 
Covariates help control for some important factors that might affect them; yet there are likely 
several sources of unobserved characteristics that we cannot control for, such as genetic 
composition, risk-taking propensity, altruism, or other traits that may affect why some individuals 
transfer and other do not. To partly address the possibility of unobserved characteristics 
affecting transfers, health, and shocks, we use fixed-effects models to control for unobserved 
time-invariant characteristics that may enter these relationships. Model (1) accounts for 
household size and composition measures that incorporate information on the health status of 
transfer partners. Models (2) and (3) include measures of health of the respondent, with the 
MCS and the PCS scores in the former, and their categorical counterparts in the latter. Models 
(4) and (5) focus on shocks, both as total count and as shock-specific dummies. Finally, model 
(6) combines all previous specifications.  
Across all these models, within-individual variation in transfers and socioeconomic/health 
characteristics identify the estimated coefficients, with variation occurring during up to six years 
of MLSFH longitudinal follow-up during 2006-12 and MLSFH surveys covering transfer patterns 
occurring during 2004-12. Because the analyses control for individual fixed effects, the analyses 
document to which extent changes in family contexts, economic shocks and mental/physical 
health are associated with changes in intergenerational transfers, while persistent (and arguably 
important) across-individual (or family) differences in transfer patterns are absorbed in the fixed 
effects.  
 
Net transfers to children 
 
Table 4 reports coefficients from fixed-effects regressions of changes in household composition, 
physical and mental health, and external shocks on net financial transfers to children.5 The total 
number of children alive is a strong and statistically significant determinant, confirming the 
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descriptive evidence that the higher level of transfer activity with children (versus parents) is in 
large part a function of the large family sizes observed in Malawi. Additional analyses indicate 
that transfers to children increase if there are more children alive, and that middle-aged 
respondents receive more transfers from children in households with more living children.6 
Taken together, findings from model (1) suggest that transfer flows to children are a stable 
characteristic of the family, rather than a response to worsening health conditions of children. 
Though the health status of children has little bearing on downward transfers, in models (2) and 
(3) we find that the physical health of the respondent is positively related to net transfers to 
children. Respondents experiencing moderate and severe physical limitations provide roughly 
half a transfer less to their children as compared to those with no limitations (the magnitude is 
essentially the same for moderate and severe physical limitations, while due to smaller sample 
size, the coeficient is only significant for the moderate category).7 Both net and total transfers 
with children peak in the early/middle adult ages (30-45, see Figure 1 Panel A), where changes 
in physical health can have big income effects (Blackledge-Foughali, 2016; Leppert, 2016). 
These health shocks thus likely constrain the available pool of available resources and reduce 
transfers to children. We find no association between mental health and net transfers to 
children. Declines in mental health happen primarily at older ages in Malawi (Kohler et al., 
Forthcoming), and the age profile of transfers to children by mental health (Figure 1 Panel D) 
suggests that the association between mental health and transfers is small in the age range 
where downward intergenerational transfers are at their peak.  
The total count of shocks experienced by the household (collected in 2008-2012) shows 
a positive and significant association. Although we might expect transfers to decline with the 
number of shocks, the observed positive association suggests that prime-aged adults see 
providing for children as their first priority, and rely on transfers to protect them from the adverse 
effects of these shocks. Though the cumulative number of shocks is strongly significant, each 
type of shock in isolation seems to play a smaller role, excepting the breakup of a household. 
21 
 
Overall, however, external shocks  play a fairly small role in driving net transfers to children, as 
compared to less volatile determinants such as household composition and respondents’ 
physical health.  
[Table 4 about here] 
 
Net transfers to parents 
 
Table 5 reports fixed-effects estimates of changes in household composition, health, and 
external shocks on net transfers to parents. Differently from net transfers to children, we 
observe that both the number of parents and the number of unhealthy parents alive positively 
affect net transfers to parents, with the effect of the latter more stable across specifications. This 
finding suggests that transfers upwards are a significant source of support for elderly parents, 
especially if they are in poor health.8 These transfers appear to be compensating for the lack of 
a pension system in this rural SSA context, which fits nicely within the general conceptualization 
of an old-age security hypothesis. The underlying transfer mechanism is hence one of direct 
reciprocity, where parents give first and children give back later.  
Moving to models (2) and (3) we find that, while physical health is a strong determinant 
of net transfers to children, mental health plays a key role in shaping transfers to parents. This is 
evidenced by both the SF-12 mental health score and the categorical DAX index, which shows 
a clear negative gradient robust to the inclusion of additional controls (model 6). In resource-
poor contexts, mental health has been widely recognized as having important implications for 
individual productivity, individual/family-level well-being, and overall economic development  
(Bloom et al., 2011; Canavan et al., 2013; Cornwell et al., 2009; Sorsdahl et al., 2011; 
Tampubolon and Hanandita, 2014; The Lancet, 2011). In the MLSFH sample, recent research 
has shown that mental health has substantial negative repercussions for earnings and work 
efforts (Kohler et al., Forthcoming), and that mental health declines rapidly in the older adult 
ages (45-60) where net transfers to parents peak (see Figure 2 Panel A).  
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[Table 5 about here] 
In line with Table 4, household-level shocks have little explanatory power, particularly 
those related to income losses or unplanned expenses. The death or serious illness of a 
household member is the only shock that is associated with a statistically significant decrease in 
net transfers to parents. This is reasonable, as elderly parents make up the socio-demographic 
group which is most exposed to the risk of dying. Yet it would be insightful to verify whether it is 
indeed mortality among the elderly that is driving lower net transfers to parents, an extension we 
carry out in the following sub-section. Taken together, these findings suggest once again that 
health and household-composition variables – or shocks that are closely tied to variation in 
household size and composition such as the death of a household member – are among the 
strongest determinants of net transfers to parents. At a broader level, this analysis provides 
additional bearing that the insurance argument might not be central to transfer motives in rural 
Malawi, where exchange, reciprocity and old-age motives play a more prominent role. 
 
c. Extensions 
 
Group-specific mortality 
 
 We next carry out a brief investigation of how transfers respond to specific types of household 
mortality. These additional analyses allow us to (i) identify the demographic group(s) whose 
mortality affects transfer patterns (e.g. young, middle-aged, or elderly), and (ii) verify whether 
the association between experiencing the death of a household member and decreased 
transfers to parents discussed above is effectively driven by the death of a household member 
versus a serious illness (i.e. separate between health issues and mortality). Table A2 
(Appendix) reports fixed-effects estimates of subgroup-mortality dummies on net transfers to 
children (left panel) and parents (right panel). A male death in the age group 0-14 negatively 
affects net transfers to children, with the effect fully driven by a reduction in the amount of 
transfers provided to children. With large household sizes, transfers from children do not 
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significantly change, as the surviving children likely replace the dead one(s) in the provision of 
upward transfers. The primary effect of a death among the elderly is an overall decline in 
transfers received, and the death of an older woman results in a substantial decline in upward 
transfers (suggesting that older women may be substantial recipients of these transfers). In 
sum, net transfers to children decline with the death of a young household member, typically 
male, while net transfers to parents decline with the death of an older person, typically female. 
These findings support our overall conclusions that changes in household size and composition 
are amongst the strongest drivers of intergenerational transfers in low-income, disadvantaged 
contexts like rural Malawi.  
 
Income and wealth 
 
While income-related shocks have limited predictive power in explaining variations in transfer 
patterns, intergenerational transfers may more directly respond to longer-term changes in 
income and wealth. Table A3 (Appendix) reports fixed-effects regressions of income and wealth 
measures on net transfers to children (left panel) and parents (right panel). In order to separate 
between individual-level predictors and household-level predictors, each panel is further 
subdivided into two sections. Individual-level variables include respondent’s earnings over the 
previous year, a dummy for whether the respondent holds any savings for the future - such as a 
bank account, savings group, or cash - and the value of those savings. Variables measured at 
the household-level are a wealth index (based on dwelling characteristics and household 
assets), a dummy for whether the household has a metal roof, and the total value of earnings 
from cash crops (corn, tobacco, cotton, and other) over the previous year.9 Estimates from 
Table A3 reveals that wealth measures are associated with transfers to children but not with 
transfers to parents. Obtaining a metal roof – a good proxy for an increase in household wealth 
in the Malawian context – is associated with half a transfer more to children. However, we find 
that both current earnings and savings show little association with transfers to parents and 
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transfers to children. Combined with the findings discussed in the previous section, these results 
support the idea that intergenerational transfer patterns are fairly fixed, and after controlling for 
persistent across-individual (family) differences, are primarily determined by intertemporal 
fluctuations in income and wealth. Our findings also suggest that transfers, and particularly 
transfers to parents, are largely stable and guided by primarily demographic considerations, 
strengthening evidence for an old-age support hypothesis where private transfers compensate 
for the lack of a public pension system. Conversely, the significance of household wealth for 
children highlights the higher sensitivity of these transfers to changes in financial 
circumstances.10  
 
Discussion 
 
This paper investigates patterns of intergenerational financial transfers in a rural sub-Saharan 
African population, a context where formal public transfers are limited and the family is the 
central provider of financial assistance and support. The aggregate life-cycle pattern of transfers 
among MLSFH respondents conforms to the expected pattern, and our analyses find that 
intergenerational transfers follow a strong age pattern in this low-income population: with 
increasing age, respondents provide fewer transfers to children and more transfers to parents, a 
pattern similar to that seen in high-income countries. However, underneath this well-established 
age-pattern, our longitudinal analyses document significant heterogeneity and fluidity: 
Intergenerational transfers are variable and reverse their direction, with individuals moving 
between the provider and recipient states repeatedly across their life course and within each 
major stage of the life-cycle. These micro-level patterns are in stark contrast to the more regular 
patterns of consumption and production seen in many developed populations (Lee and Mason, 
2011). We also find that prime-aged adults (those aged 40-59) bear an especially heavy burden, 
and expect to spend a significant portion of their adult years providing financial support to both 
their children and elderly parents.  
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Our focus on the micro-level determinants of intergenerational transfers, rather than only 
aggregate patterns of resource flows, allows us to gain a deeper understanding of how 
individual and family-level factors influence the movement of financial resources within the 
household. We find that transfers are highly contingent upon health status in this rural SSA 
context, but are uniquely affected by different facets of health—transfers to children decline 
substantially when the respondent is in poor physical health, while financial transfers to parents 
are more strongly affected by respondents’ mental health. As both poor mental and poor 
physical health lead to productivity shortfalls, this differentiation is somewhat puzzling. A 
possible explanation lies in the differential age patterns of transfers to parents and children. 
Both net and total transfers with children peak in the early/middle adult ages (30-45, see Figure 
1 Panel A), where changes in physical health can have outsized effects on productivity.  
Declines in mental health primarily occur at mature and older ages 45+ in this population 
(Kohler et al., Forthcoming)—that is, at respondent’s ages when transfers to children start to 
diminish (Figure 1, Panel A) but transfers to parents are increasing (Figure 2, Panel A).  
Contrary to common perceptions about family transfers ameliorating short-term shocks, 
transfers in our analyses are driven primarily by demographic factors such as changes in health, 
household size, and household composition. Short-term external shocks are associated with 
abrupt changes in income and household wealth; yet they do little to explain changes in 
intergenerational transfer patterns. Hence, though previous studies have inferred that 
intergenerational transfers primarily function as a mode of insurance in low-income contexts, our 
findings from longitudinal data suggest that their role is more complex, encapsulating a mix of 
functions ranging from direct exchange to old-age support, in a way that compensates for the 
absence of a proper public pension system. 
As one of the first research efforts studying the micro-level dynamics of intergenerational 
transfers in a resource-deprived setting, our research is not without limitations – though many of 
these set the ground for subsequent research. First, as the quantitative measurement of 
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transfers in contexts such as Malawi is inherently difficult, the MLSFH did not attempt to 
monetize financial transfers between respondents and their children/parents. While the chosen 
metric for measuring the intensity of transfer exchanges is simple and intuitive, we do not rule 
out the possibility of alternative specifications that might be better suited to our research 
question. The MLSFH transfer questions are also retrospective in nature, which may risk 
overlooking the more frequent and smaller transfers that take place on a nearly daily basis in 
low-income settings (Platteau, 1997; Weinreb, 2007). Second, although our paper is among the 
first to study micro-macro intergenerational transfer dynamics in a Sub-Saharan country, we 
acknowledge the potential weaknesses introduced by pooling four waves of data, including the 
different sampling frame for respondents in 2012 (only the 45+ population) and the lack of fully 
harmonized variables of interest such as shocks (not collected in 2006). Third, in common with 
other life-table-based measures, our estimates of life expectancy in each transfer state are 
derived from a synthetic cohort where the age-speciﬁc rates of transition remain constant for the 
foreseeable future, and thus will not exactly match the lived experience of any single cohort. 
Fourth, while fixed-effects regression provides a powerful tool to address unobserved factors 
associated with health, shocks, and transfers, it does not rule out the possibility that, for 
instance, lower transfers could cause worse mental and physical health. We believe that our 
interpretation that the direction of the effect is primarily from physical and mental health to 
transfers is the most likely in this poor SSA context, but endogeneity remains an issue of 
concern and causality cannot be claimed. Lastly, although we provide a comprehensive account 
of some of the factors that are most likely to affect transfer patterns, we do not set out to 
systematically test the theories of intergenerational transfers in developing countries (Becker 
and Tomes, 1976; Frankenberg et al., 2002; Lillard and Willis, 1997). We nonetheless regard 
our findings as novel and informative about the motivations for transfers in the SSA context.  
Any analysis of longitudinal data must take account of the possibility of attrition bias. 
Though a more detailed description of attrition in the MLSFH cohort is contained in Kohler et al. 
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(2015), including a summary of the common reasons for attrition in this rural Malawian context, 
we undertake a brief evaluation of whether this attrition may introduce bias into estimates of our 
key outcomes. Table A4 in the Appendix presents the mean number of transfers to/from 
children and parents among individuals who attrited from the sample during the 2008-2012 
period, and those who did not. The raw means show that attritors provided more transfers to 
their children, and fewer transfer to their parents than non-attritors. Controlling for basic 
demographic characteristics (age, age2, sex, and region) substantially reduces this bias, though 
does not completely eliminate it for net transfers to/from parents. However, these differences 
are substantively small—after controlling for demographics, attritors provide 0.13 fewer transfers 
to their parents—and we are confident that the bias introduced into our estimates is minimal. 
The micro-data-based analyses in this article represent a substantial methodological 
shift from previous measures of life-course intergenerational transfers estimated in SSA. We 
have described the differences between macro-level life-cycle patterns and the highly fluid 
individual-level transfer dynamics, and showed how these individual-level patterns are related to 
factors such as household composition, health, mortality, and wealth. Our findings show the 
flexibility and utility of using longitudinal micro-level data to investigate patterns of household 
transfers. Relying only on cross-sectional analyses to understand household economics may 
overlook many of the most important correlates of financial transfers. Many other existing 
models of characterizing life-cycle patterns of transfers – such as the National Transfer 
Accounts project – rely on cross-sectional data, and are hence blind to the influences of 
individual factors such as physical and mental health. Some of our most important findings—the 
interrelations between changes in household composition and health and changes in net 
transfers—are not estimable using cross-sectional data. These micro-level insights into 
household economics are key for developing effective and targeted interventions.  
Our analyses suggest that the role of transfers in this rural sub-Saharan context is 
significantly more complex than suggested by theories and evidence on aggregate transfer 
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patterns, and at the micro-level, intergenerational transfers encapsulate multiple functions 
ranging from direct exchange to old-age support in the absence of a public pension system. 
Prime-aged adults are key providers of intergenerational transfers to both their parents and 
children, and that their ability to provide these transfers is highly contingent on their physical and 
mental health. However, this age group has largely been left out of recent large-scale health-
focused interventions and policies implemented in SSA (Aboderin and Beard, 2015; Beard et 
al., 2011), and many policymakers in SSA see investment in health resources for the older 
population as “irrelevant to core national development interests” (Aboderin, 2009). Our analyses 
suggest that this is misguided–this older adult group acts as a key financial resource within 
families, and investments in improving the health of this population have the potential to 
signiﬁcantly improve aggregate economic growth. 
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Tables 
 
Table 1 Descriptive statistics for MLSFH respondents, 2006-2012 survey waves 
 
  Survey wave 
  2006 2008 2010 2012      
Socio-Demographic     
Female (prop.) 0.55 0.59 0.59 0.57 
Age (mean) 35.1 41.2 43 58.8 
Age (prop.)     
<20 0.15 0.07 0.01 . 
20-40 0.52 0.47 0.49 . 
40-60 0.29 0.30 0.33 0.61 
60+ 0.04 0.15 0.17 0.39 
Region (prop.)     
North 0.33 0.31 0.34 0.33 
Central  0.33 0.34 0.33 0.30 
South 0.34 0.35 0.34 0.36 
Years of education (mean) 3.7 4.5 4.0 4.4 
Level of education (prop.)     
None 0.24 0.25 0.21 0.36 
Primary 0.62 0.62 0.64 0.58 
Secondary+ 0.14 0.13 0.15 0.06      
Health      
Survival (mean)     
# Unhealthy children alive 0.2 0.2 0.2 0.3 
# Parents alive  1.6 1.5 1.5 1.2 
# Unhealthy parents alive  0.4 0.3 0.3 0.5 
Physical health      
SF-12 PH score (mean) 52.5 51.6 49.4 47.7 
Physical limitations (prop.)     
No  0.81 0.77 0.69 0.59 
Moderate 0.16 0.18 0.23 0.30 
Severe 0.03 0.05 0.08 0.11 
Mental health      
SF-12 MH score (mean) 55.6 54.0 52.2 53.0 
Depression/anxiety (prop.)     
No  0.70 0.49 0.48 0.51 
Mild 0.23 0.41 0.36 0.41 
Moderate/Severe 0.08 0.10 0.16 0.09      
Transfers     
To/From children (mean)     
To 9.2 8.3 8.6 7.3 
From 1.3 2.4 2.7 5.7 
Net 7.9 5.9 5.9 1.6 
To/From parents (mean)     
To 1.7 2.0 2.0 1.6 
From 1.5 1.3 1.4 0.4 
Net 0.1 0.7 0.7 1.2      
Shocks      
Number of shocks (mean) . 1.71 1.68 1.34 
Type of shock (prop.)     
Death/Illness of a HH member . 0.43 0.36 0.30 
Poor crop yields . 0.74 0.65 0.66 
Loss of source of income . 0.35 0.45 0.25 
HH breakup or divorce . 0.09 0.09 0.04 
Damage to the house  . 0.12 0.13 0.10      
Observations (N) 3,378 3,857 3,494 1,256 
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Table 2 Distribution of observed transitions between transfer states (provider/neutral/recipient) 
during 2006-2012 (4 MLSFH waves) 
 
Observed distribution among transfer 
states and death  
Number of 
transitions  
% among 
all 
transitions    
Number of 
transitions  
% among 
all 
transitions    
Number of 
transitions  
% among 
all 
transitions  
 20-39  40-59  60+ 
Transfers to/from children         
Provider at both interviews 2258 77.3%  1839 66.9%  206 15.2% 
Provider to neutral 16 0.5%  178 6.5%  68 5.0% 
Provider to recipient 15 0.5%  125 4.5%  118 8.7% 
Provider to dead 40 1.4%  47 1.7%  17 1.3% 
Neutral to provider 5 0.2%  95 3.5%  47 3.5% 
Neutral at both interviews 7 0.2%  99 3.6%  70 5.2% 
Neutral to recipient 0 0.0%  94 3.4%  142 10.5% 
Neutral to dead 2 0.1%  6 0.2%  9 0.7% 
Recipient to provider 39 1.3%  31 1.1%  68 5.0% 
Recipient to neutral 3 0.1%  59 2.1%  105 7.8% 
Recipient at both interviews 6 0.2%  126 4.6%  430 31.8% 
Recipient to dead 1 0.0%  6 0.2%  53 3.9% 
No children to provider 217 7.4%  8 0.3%  2 0.1% 
No children at both interviews 306 10.5%  31 1.1%  12 0.9% 
No children to dead 7 0.2%  4 0.1%  4 0.3% 
         
  20-39   40-59       
Transfers to/from children         
Provider at both interviews 276 9.5%  285 10.4%    
Provider to neutral 283 9.7%  246 9.0%    
Provider to recipient 40 1.4%  17 0.6%    
Provider to no parents 23 0.8%  53 1.9%    
Provider to dead 10 0.3%  17 0.6%    
Neutral to provider 362 12.4%  290 10.6%    
Neutral at both interviews 837 28.8%  501 18.4%    
Neutral to recipient 143 4.9%  35 1.3%    
Neutral to no parents 58 2.0%  108 4.0%    
Neutral to dead 20 0.7%  16 0.6%    
Recipient to provider 84 2.9%  16 0.6%    
Recipient to neutral 278 9.5%  65 2.4%    
Recipient at both interviews 120 4.1%  12 0.4%    
Recipient to no parents  13 0.4%  11 0.4%    
Recipient to dead 9 0.3%  0 0.0%    
No parents at both interviews 344 11.8%  1026 37.6%    
No parents to dead 11 0.4%   30 1.1%    
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Table 3 Partial Life Expectancy in transfer states: Financial transfers to/from children (A) and 
parents (B) 
 
  A. Transfers to/from children 
Age 20-29  30-39  40-49  50-59  60+ 
  Estimate %  Estimate %  Estimate  %  Estimate %  Estimate % 
Female               
Life expectancy 9.8   9.6   9.4   9.1   12.6  
Provider 9.1 93%  8.3 86%  7.2 77%  4.8 53%  3.1 25% 
Neutral 0.5 5%  1 10%  1.5 16%  2.5 27%  4.1 33% 
Recipient 0.2 2%  0.4 4%  0.7 7%  1.7 19%  5.4 43% 
               
Male               
Life expectancy 9.8   9.6   9.2   8.6   12.5  
Provider 9.2 94%  8.7 91%  7.9 86%  5.9 69%  5.4 43% 
Neutral 0.4 4%  0.7 7%  1 11%  1.9 22%  4.1 33% 
Recipient 0.1 1%  0.2 2%  0.3 3%  0.9 10%  3.1 25% 
  B. Transfers to/from parents       
Age 20-29   30-39   40-49   50-59   
  Estimate %  Estimate %  Estimate  %  Estimate %    
Female               
Life expectancy 9.7   9.6   9.4   9.1     
Provider 1.7 18%  2.2 23%  2 21%  1.9 21%    
Neutral 4.9 51%  5 52%  4.8 51%  4.1 45%    
Recipient 1.6 16%  0.7 7%  0.4 4%  0.3 3%    
No parents 1.4 14%  1.7 18%  2.2 23%  2.9 32%    
               
Male               
Life expectancy 9.7   9.5   9.2   8.9     
Provider 2.3 24%  3.3 35%  2.9 32%  2.7 30%    
Neutral 4.4 45%  4 42%  3.8 41%  3 34%    
Recipient 1.4 14%  0.4 4%  0.2 2%  0.2 2%    
No parents 1.6 16%   1.8 19%   2.3 25%   3 34%    
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Table 4 Fixed-effects regressions of household, health and shocks variables on net transfers to 
children 
 
Net transfers to children HH Composition   Health    Shocks   All 
(1)   (2) (3)   (4) (5)   (6) 
           
# of children alive in the HH 1.292***        0.972*** 
 (0.100)        (0.141) 
# of reported unhealthy children in the HH 0.040        0.175 
 (0.122)        (0.163) 
          
SF12 Mental health score   0.001       
   (0.006)       
SF12 Physical health score   0.015**       
   (0.007)       
          
Depression/anxiety (ref. No)          
          
Mild    0.080     -0.034 
    (0.115)     (0.147) 
Moderate/Severe    0.229     0.007 
    (0.187)     (0.228) 
          
Physical limitations (ref. No)          
          
Moderate    -0.479***     -0.089 
    (0.158)     (0.204) 
Severe    -0.480     -0.386 
    (0.318)     (0.391) 
          
Total # of shocks      0.137**    
      (0.069)    
          
Type of shock          
          
Death/Illness of a HH member       0.050  0.048 
       (0.138)  (0.144) 
Poor crop yields       0.066  0.003 
       (0.150)  (0.158) 
Loss of source of income       0.216  0.182 
       (0.140)  (0.146) 
HH breakup or divorce       0.421*  0.400 
       (0.249)  (0.257) 
Damage to the house        0.161  0.213 
       (0.205)  (0.219) 
          
Wave (ref. 2006)          
          
2008 -0.466***  -0.011 -0.028      
 (0.100)  (0.107) (0.108)      
2010 -0.771***  -0.084 -0.115  -0.058 -0.097  -0.298*** 
 (0.121)  (0.123) (0.122)  (0.097) (0.103)  (0.113) 
2012 -3.096***  -2.449*** -2.464***  -2.037*** -2.063***  -2.232*** 
 (0.179)  (0.182) (0.183)  (0.170) (0.172)  (0.178) 
          
Constant 0.632  5.434*** 6.448***  5.351*** 5.379***  1.016 
 (0.432)  (0.533) (0.093)  (0.131) (0.148)  (0.667) 
          
Observations 11,065  9,599 9,619  8,044 7,896  6,983 
R-squared 0.137  0.061 0.062  0.059 0.061  0.101 
Number of groups 4,854   4,236 4,174   4,251 4,217   3,717 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Table 5 Fixed-effects regressions of household, health and shocks variables on net transfers to 
parents 
 
Net transfers to parents HH Composition   Health    Shocks   All (1)   (2) (3)   (4) (5)   (6) 
           
# of parents alive in the HH 0.369***        0.128 
 (0.123)        (0.161) 
# of reported unhealthy parents in the HH 0.128**        0.166** 
 (0.051)        (0.071) 
          
SF12 Mental health score   0.008**       
   (0.003)       
SF12 Physical health score   -0.006       
   (0.004)       
          
Depression/anxiety (ref. No)          
          
Mild    -0.100*     -0.182** 
    (0.060)     (0.079) 
Moderate/Severe    -0.246**     -0.284** 
    (0.098)     (0.123) 
          
Physical limitations (ref. No)          
          
Moderate    -0.076     0.005 
    (0.075)     (0.093) 
Severe    0.077     0.123 
    (0.172)     (0.249) 
          
Total # of shocks      -0.024    
      (0.035)    
          
Type of shock          
          
Death/Illness of a HH member       -0.166**  -0.167** 
       (0.070)  (0.075) 
Poor crop yields       0.039  0.078 
       (0.076)  (0.081) 
Loss of source of income       0.063  0.068 
       (0.072)  (0.078) 
HH breakup or divorce       0.024  0.042 
       (0.128)  (0.141) 
Damage to the house        0.025  -0.013 
       (0.119)  (0.128) 
Wave (ref. 2006)          
          
2008 0.565***  0.512*** 0.515***      
 (0.053)  (0.058) (0.059)      
2010 0.640***  0.578*** 0.598***  0.034 0.019  0.061 
 (0.056)  (0.059) (0.058)  (0.052) (0.055)  (0.061) 
2012 0.661***  0.597*** 0.610***  0.054 0.044  0.110 
 (0.087)  (0.089) (0.088)  (0.086) (0.087)  (0.092) 
          
Constant -0.483**  0.026 0.229***  0.755*** 0.732***  0.538** 
 (0.194)  (0.286) (0.039)  (0.066) (0.074)  (0.259) 
          
Observations 7,764  6,702 6,760  5,084 4,975  4,334 
R-squared 0.043  0.037 0.037  0.001 0.003  0.013 
Number of groups 3,646   3,161 3,159   2,967 2,942   2,600 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
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Notes 
1 We conducted a sensitivity analysis testing thresholds of +3/-3 and +4/-4 for provider/recipient 
classification; results for transfers to/from children were largely similar but duration of life in the 
neutral transfer state increased fairly substantially for transfers to/from parents (particularly for 
the +4/-4 classification schema). These analyses are available on request. 
2 Our models do take into account the fact that individuals can move from having living children 
to having no living children, though these transition rates are extremely low and are thus not 
shown in our analyses. 
3 Our categorical measure of mental health is a combined depression/anxiety index (DAX) 
derived from two questions from the SF12: “Q1: How much time of the time during the past 4 
weeks have you felt calm and peaceful?” and “Q2: How much of the time during the past 4 
weeks have you felt downhearted and depressed?”. The response categories range from 1 =“All 
of the time” to 5 = “None of the time”. The DAX is then computed as follows: DAX = 0 (no 
depression/anxiety) when Q1 ≤ 2 and Q2 ≥ 4; DAX = 2 (moderate/severe depression/anxiety if 
Q1 ≥ 4 and Q2 ≤ 2; and DAX = 1 (mild depression/anxiety) otherwise. 
4 Disability classification is based on two questions from the SF12 “Q1: Do you have any health 
problems that limit you in carrying out moderate activities?” and “Q2: Do you have any health 
problems that limit you in carrying out strenuous activities?”, with each question providing a list 
of moderately/strenuous activities and response categories of “not limited”, “limited a little” and 
“limited a lot”. Individuals with no limitations in either set of activities are classified as healthy, 
those who respond “somewhat limited” on either question are classified as moderately limited, 
and individuals who respond “limited a lot” on either question are classified as severely limited. 
5 Note that the sizeable coefficient on the 2012 dummy is likely driven by the shift from a broad 
age distribution of respondents in 2006, 2008, and 2010 to a narrow set of ages in 2012, where 
only respondents 40+ were re-interviewed.  
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6 These analyses on single transfer components (transfers to children, transfers from children, 
transfer to parents, transfers from parents) are not shown, though they are available upon 
request. 
7 This is in line with the age profile reported in Figure 2 (panel C), showing lower net transfers to 
children across all ages on the part of individuals with limitations. However, as we 
operationalized the transfer metric drawing on categorical responses, we suggest an ordinal 
interpretation of the coefficients, rather than interval, and believe the magnitude of the effects is 
in these models less meaningful than their sign and statistical significance. 
8 Additional analyses (not shown) reveal that the effect of the number of unhealthy parents on 
net transfers is driven by an increase in upward transfers to parents, rather than by a decrease 
of downward transfers from the reportedly unhealthy members. 
9 We considered additional individual-level predictors such as labor force indicators. The 
MLSFH includes a short module collecting the number of hours worked over the previous week 
in salaried work, agricultural labor, and other activities (and the related earnings), yet the 
variables collected in 2010 and 2012 differ from those of 2006 and 2008, hence making it hard 
to exploit the longitudinal dimension. Longitudinal analyses limited to the 2010 and 2012 waves 
(available upon request) reveal that these indicators have little to no explanatory power.  
10 We also run more complicated models including both health and wealth/income variables in 
the same specification, in an effort to investigate whether the health effect on transfers works 
through the income channel. As even after controlling for these variables physical health 
remains a strong predictor of transfers to children, and mental health remains a strong predictor 
of transfers to parents, we choose not to report these models (available upon request). 
 
 
Figures 
 
Figure 1 Age profiles of net transfers to children 
 
A Total transfers with children B Net transfers to/from children, by sex
C Net transfers to/from children, D Net transfers to/from children,
by respondent's physical health by respondent's Mental health
Figure 2 Age profiles of net transfers to parents 
 
 
A Total transfers with parents B Net transfers to/from parents, by sex
C Net transfers to/from parents, D Net transfers to/from parents, 
by respondent's physical health by respondent's mental health
  
Appendix 
 
Table A1 Random-effect regressions of socio-demographic variables on net financial transfers to 
children and net financial transfers to parents 
  
  Net transfers to children   Net transfers to parents 
  (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) 
 
          
 
          
Female -1.901*** 
   
-2.674*** 
 
-0.584*** 
   
-0.589*** 
 
(0.199) 
   
(0.184) 
 
(0.055) 
   
(0.054) 
            Age 
 
-0.171*** 
  
-0.183*** 
  
0.043*** 
  
0.040*** 
  
(0.005) 
  
(0.006) 
  
(0.002) 
  
(0.002) 
            Education (ref. None) 
          
            Primary 
  
1.229*** 
 
0.001 
   
0.016 
 
0.058 
   
(0.165) 
 
(0.160) 
   
(0.056) 
 
(0.061) 
          Secondary+ 
  
1.407*** 
 
-1.146*** 
   
-0.346*** 
 
-0.354*** 
   
(0.273) 
 
(0.299) 
   
(0.094) 
 
(0.102) 
            Region of 
residence (ref. 
Central) 
           
            South 
   
-0.518** -0.341* 
    
-0.108* -0.072 
    
(0.222) (0.200) 
    
(0.063) (0.060) 
North  
   
-0.065 0.280 
    
0.180*** 0.286*** 
    
(0.250) (0.227) 
    
(0.068) (0.065) 
Wave (ref. 2006) 
           
            2008 -0.469*** -0.063 -0.500*** -0.471*** -0.027 
 
0.541*** 0.446*** 0.528*** 0.530*** 0.466*** 
 
(0.094) (0.095) (0.095) (0.094) (0.096) 
 
(0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) (0.048) 
2010 -0.504*** 0.183 -0.573*** -0.507*** 0.254** 
 
0.598*** 0.424*** 0.595*** 0.584*** 0.452*** 
 
(0.108) (0.111) (0.110) (0.109) (0.113) 
 
(0.050) (0.050) (0.051) (0.050) (0.051) 
2012 -3.203*** -1.788*** -3.217*** -3.190*** -1.698*** 
 
0.810*** 0.255*** 0.777*** 0.784*** 0.287*** 
 
(0.173) (0.182) (0.173) (0.173) (0.182) 
 
(0.078) (0.083) (0.078) (0.079) (0.083) 
            Constant 7.451*** 13.158*** 5.423*** 6.522*** 15.407*** 
 
0.446*** -1.241*** 0.163*** 0.088* -0.876*** 
 
(0.162) (0.214) (0.163) (0.165) (0.339) 
 
(0.053) (0.086) (0.054) (0.052) (0.120) 
            Observations 10,861 10,858 10,814 10,861 10,813   7,636 7,633 7,604 7,636 7,603 
Number of groups 4,643 4,640 4,628 4,643 4,627   3,465 3,462 3,455 3,465 3,454 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
  
  
Table A2 Fixed-effects regressions of death of at least a household member in the two years prior to 
the survey, by demographic subgroup, on net transfers 
 
  Transfers to/from children   Transfers to/from parents 
 
To   From   Net 
 
To   From    Net 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
 
(1) 
 
(2) 
 
(3) 
            
 
          
Death of at least a HH member in 
the preceding 2 Years 
           
            Male 0-14 -0.971*** 
 
-0.040 
 
-0.930*** 
 
0.012 
 
-0.235* 
 
0.247 
 
(0.252) 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.291) 
 
(0.140) 
 
(0.129) 
 
(0.173) 
Female 0-14 -0.373 
 
-0.203 
 
-0.169 
 
-0.012 
 
0.157 
 
-0.171 
 
(0.259) 
 
(0.149) 
 
(0.289) 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.125) 
 
(0.175) 
Male 15-59 -0.007 
 
-0.182 
 
0.174 
 
-0.166 
 
-0.030 
 
-0.136 
 
(0.274) 
 
(0.224) 
 
(0.365) 
 
(0.126) 
 
(0.115) 
 
(0.151) 
Female 15-59 -0.494* 
 
-0.315 
 
-0.179 
 
-0.045 
 
0.007 
 
-0.051 
 
(0.297) 
 
(0.283) 
 
(0.379) 
 
(0.161) 
 
(0.138) 
 
(0.197) 
Male 60+ 0.247 
 
0.117 
 
0.130 
 
-0.077 
 
-0.179** 
 
0.093 
 
(0.194) 
 
(0.140) 
 
(0.233) 
 
(0.095) 
 
(0.089) 
 
(0.120) 
Female 60+ -0.308 
 
-0.047 
 
-0.261 
 
-0.452*** 
 
-0.255** 
 
-0.187 
 
(0.271) 
 
(0.196) 
 
(0.335) 
 
(0.145) 
 
(0.111) 
 
(0.158) 
Wave (ref. 2006) 
           
            2008 0.480*** 
 
0.493*** 
 
-0.013 
 
0.280*** 
 
-0.257*** 
 
0.538*** 
 
(0.083) 
 
(0.053) 
 
(0.097) 
 
(0.042) 
 
(0.040) 
 
(0.052) 
2010 0.896*** 
 
0.979*** 
 
-0.083 
 
0.336*** 
 
-0.254*** 
 
0.591*** 
 
(0.094) 
 
(0.066) 
 
(0.114) 
 
(0.044) 
 
(0.043) 
 
(0.055) 
2012 -0.680*** 
 
1.817*** 
 
-2.497*** 
 
0.137* 
 
-0.434*** 
 
0.571*** 
 
(0.143) 
 
(0.119) 
 
(0.179) 
 
(0.072) 
 
(0.057) 
 
(0.086) 
            Constant 8.185*** 
 
1.927*** 
 
6.259*** 
 
1.699*** 
 
1.552*** 
 
0.148*** 
 
(0.063) 
 
(0.039) 
 
(0.075) 
 
(0.027) 
 
(0.026) 
 
(0.033) 
            Observations 11,075 
 
11,075 
 
11,074 
 
7,845 
 
7,838 
 
7,834 
R-squared 0.039 
 
0.062 
 
0.058 
 
0.021 
 
0.019 
 
0.039 
Number of groups 4,857   4,857   4,856   3,665   3,664   3,663 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses.  
*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
Table A3 Fixed-effects regressions of income and wealth variables on net transfers to children and parents 
 
  Net transfers to children   Net transfers to parents 
 
Individual-level   Household-level 
 
Individual-level   Household-level 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
 
(1) (2) (3) 
 
(4) (5) (6) 
        
 
      
 
      
 
      
Earnings (past year) -0.003 
       
0.005 
      
 
(0.013) 
       
(0.006) 
      
                Any savings (Ref.: No) 
 
-0.019 
       
0.041 
     
  
(0.117) 
       
(0.061) 
     
                Value of savings 
  
0.075 
       
0.035 
    
   
(0.057) 
       
(0.029) 
    
                Wealth Index 
    
0.178*** 
       
0.004 
  
     
(0.058) 
       
(0.029) 
  
                Metal roof (Ref.: No) 
     
0.594*** 
       
-0.060 
 
      
(0.216) 
       
(0.109) 
 
                Earnings from cash crops 
      
0.008 
       
0.048 
       
(0.039) 
       
(0.031) 
Wave (ref.: 2006) 
               
                2008 0.002 0.001 -0.068 
 
-0.003 -0.034 0.006 
 
0.522*** 0.518*** 0.458*** 
 
0.431*** 0.541*** 0.492*** 
 
(0.101) (0.102) (0.281) 
 
(0.102) (0.097) (0.102) 
 
(0.055) (0.055) (0.145) 
 
(0.055) (0.053) (0.056) 
2010 -0.070 -0.064 0.078 
 
-0.095 -0.125 -0.057 
 
0.557*** 0.559*** 0.283* 
 
0.444*** 0.594*** 0.524*** 
 
(0.120) (0.120) (0.306) 
 
(0.118) (0.115) (0.123) 
 
(0.059) (0.058) (0.147) 
 
(0.057) (0.056) (0.059) 
2012 -2.448*** -2.454*** -2.321*** 
 
-2.501*** -2.565*** -2.491*** 
 
0.556*** 0.548*** 0.369** 
 
0.478*** 0.576*** 0.528*** 
 
(0.182) (0.183) (0.433) 
 
(0.183) (0.181) (0.188) 
 
(0.089) (0.088) (0.188) 
 
(0.088) (0.087) (0.090) 
                
                Constant 6.223*** 6.186*** 5.736*** 
 
6.267*** 6.156*** 6.139*** 
 
0.095 0.162*** 0.077 
 
0.347*** 0.168*** -0.672* 
 
(0.206) (0.079) (0.931) 
 
(0.075) (0.078) (0.677) 
 
(0.105) (0.038) (0.470) 
 
(0.034) (0.035) (0.343) 
                Observations 10,531 10,513 3,389 
 
10,523 10,859 10,354 
 
7,354 7,348 2,496 
 
7,059 7,636 7,307 
R-squared 0.057 0.058 0.055 
 
0.059 0.057 0.055 
 
0.034 0.034 0.019 
 
0.023 0.038 0.035 
Number of Groups 4,576 4,570 2,327   4,590 4,653 4,562   3,391 3,390 1,741   3,354 3,474 3,387 
Notes: Robust standard errors in parentheses. Earnings, savings, and the value from cash crops have been multiplied by 1,000 and transformed using the inverse hyperbolic sine 
transformation. *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1 
  
 
Table A4 Analyses of attrition bias: total net transfers to/from children and parents for individuals who 
attrited from the sample between 2006 and 2012, MLSFH sample 
 
  Non-attritor Attritor Sig. 
To/from children  6.04 6.54 **/- 
    To/from parents  0.74 0.51 **/* 
 
Notes: The “Sig.” column indicates whether the difference in net transfers is significantly different between those who did not attrite from the 
sample versus those who did. The symbol before the slash indicates the significance level of the difference without controls, and the symbol 
after the slash indicates the significance level after controlling for age, age2, male, region, and wave. **p<0.01, *p<0.05, -p≥0.05.  
 
 
 
 
 
  
  
Figure A1 Proportions in Provider, Neutral, Recipient, and No Children States, transfers to/from 
children (A) and parents (B) 
 
A     Transfers to/from children    
 
B     Transfers to/from parents 
 
 
Notes: Appendix Figure 1 presents the microsimulation-based estimates of the proportion of living individuals who are in each transfer state 
at each age. This is essentially equivalent to the proportion of individuals in state i at each age in the stationary-equivalent population 
(Schoen 1988). Estimates in Panel A show that for both females and males, the proportion of individuals who are net providers of transfers to 
their children diminishes with age (more rapidly for females than males), and the proportion of net recipients of  financial transfers from their 
children increases with age. Panel 1B presents the proportion of living individuals in each transfer state with their parents by age. Results 
show that the proportion of individuals who are net providers of transfers to their parents increases steadily with age, and that the proportion 
of individuals receiving transfers from their parents declines sharply between ages 20 and 40. In contrast to transfers with children, this figure 
highlight that a substantial proportion of individuals are in the neutral category, and that the proportion of individuals with surviving parents 
declines rapidly with age, reaching about 50% by age 40 and 20% by age 60. The proportion of individuals providing transfers to their 
parents is smaller at younger and older ages but expands in mid-life ages from 30-50, with a particularly noticeable increase among males. 
  
